A. Except as provided in Subsection B or otherwise specifically provided by existing law, any person who has reached his eighteenth birthday shall be considered to have reached his majority as provided in Section 12-2-2 NMSA 1978 [repealed] and is an adult for all purposes the same as if he had reached his twenty-first birthday.
B. For the purposes of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act [repealed], as it relates to any gift made prior to June 18, 1971, the donee shall not be entitled to delivery or payment over of the gift until he has reached his twenty-first birthday.
History: 1953 Comp., § 13-13-1, enacted by Laws 1971, ch. 213, § 1; 1973, ch. 138, § 12.
ANNOTATIONS
Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.
Section 12-2-2 NMSA 1978 was repealed in 1997. For comparable provisions, see 12-2A-3 NMSA 1978.
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, referred to in Subsection B, formerly appeared as 46-7-1 to 46-7-10 NMSA 1978, but was by repealed Laws 1989, ch. 357, § 26. For present comparable provisions, see the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 46-7-11 NMSA 1978 et seq.
Cross references. — For consent to prenatal, delivery and postnatal treatment, see 24-1-13.1 NMSA 1978.
For contributing to delinquency of minor, see 30-6-3 NMSA 1978.
For sexually oriented material harmful to minors, see 30-37-2 NMSA 1978.
For “adult” as person 18 years of age or over under Children’s Code, see 32A-1-4 NMSA 1978.
For educational loans, legal disability of minors removed, see 58-6-3 NMSA 1978.
For alcoholic beverages, sale to person under 21 unlawful, identity cards, employment, see 60-7B-1 to 60-7B-11 NMSA 1978.
Section not unconstitutional. — Although trial court had continuing jurisdiction to modify divorce decree containing child custody provisions under the provisions of Section 40-4-7 NMSA 1978, that decree was considered final and not within the meaning of a “pending case” in N.M. Const., art. IV, § 34. Therefore, this section, which by its operation freed divorced father from making support payments to daughter who had reached age of 18, and thus, under the new section, was no longer a minor, is not unconstitutional. Phelps v. Phelps, 1973-NMSC-044, 85 N.M. 62, 509 P.2d 254.
Purpose of section. — The phrase “for all purposes” does not bar the right of parties to a contract to agree that “of full age” may be stipulated to mean 21 years; the purpose of the statute is to substitute the age of 18 for the age of 21 when any prior special law fixes an adult age of 21 years, subject to the specific exception of liquor control, and there is no analogical or interpretive basis for the contention that “for all purposes” means that a person 18 years of age is an adult in every phase of law, including the law of contracts and the modification of contracts. Peterson v. Romero, 1975-NMCA-127, 88 N.M. 483, 542 P.2d 434.
Effect of section on contracts where age stipulated. — Rental contract requiring that the rented vehicle be driven by “persons of full age (21 years)” was not modified by this section, and therefore neither car lessee nor estate of 18-year-old deceased driver were covered by the insurance provisions of the rental contract. Peterson v. Romero, 1975-NMCA-127, 88 N.M. 483, 542 P.2d 434.
On child-support payments. — Divorced husband was relieved by enactment of this statute from making further child-support payments under decree which required husband to make such payments during minority of his children or until they earlier become married or otherwise emancipated, where children were age 20 and 18 respectively. Mason v. Mason, 1973-NMSC-031, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781.
Relation between age and voluntariness of confession. — Age is a factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a confession; however, a person who has reached the age of 18 is considered an adult for most purposes. State v. Aguirre, 1978-NMCA-029, 91 N.M. 672, 579 P.2d 798, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972.
Law reviews. — For student article, “Tort Law — Either the Parents or the Child May Claim Compensation for the Child’s Medical and Non-Medical Damages: Lopez v. Southwest Community Health Services,” see 23 N.M.L. Rev. 373 (1993).
For symposium, “The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and Control,” see 3 N.M.L. Rev. 11 (1973).
For article, “Intestate Succession and Wills Law: The New Probate Code,” see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 25 (1975).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 4.
Inclusion or exclusion of the day of birth in computing one’s age, 5 A.L.R.2d 1143.
Infant’s liability for medical, dental, or hospital services, 53 A.L.R.4th 1249.
Statute protecting minors in a specified age range from rape or other sexual activity as applicable to defendant minor within protected age group, 18 A.L.R.5th 856.
43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 2, 3.