A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by the behavior of another person for which he is legally accountable as provided in sections 18-1-602 to 18-1-607. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 406, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-701.
A person is legally accountable for the behavior of another person if: He is made accountable for the conduct of that person by the statute defining the offense or by specific provision of this code; or He acts with the culpable mental state sufficient for the commission of the offense in question and he causes […]
A person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the offense. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 406, § 1. C.R.S. […]
Unless otherwise provided by the statute defining the offense, a person shall not be legally accountable for behavior of another constituting an offense if he is a victim of that offense or the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incidental to its commission. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge […]
In any prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability is based upon the behavior of another pursuant to sections 18-1-601 to 18-1-604, it is no defense that the other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the behavior in question or has been convicted of a different offense […]
A business entity is guilty of an offense if: The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on the business entity by law; or The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or knowingly tolerated by the governing body or individual […]
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to occur in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if that conduct were performed or caused by him in his own name or behalf. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 407, § 1. […]
