Sec. 20. (a) A voting system must be able to record accurately each vote and be able to produce an accurate report of all votes cast. (b) As used in this subsection, “error rate” refers to the error rate of the voting system in counting ballots (determined by taking into account only those errors that […]
Sec. 21. Software used in a voting system must monitor the overall quality of data read-write and transfer quality status, checking the number and types of errors that occur in any of the relevant operations on data and how they were corrected. As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332.
Sec. 22. Ballot card voting systems must rely on the retention of ballots as a redundant means of verifying or auditing election results. As a means of assuring accuracy in electronic voting systems, the unit must incorporate multiple memories in the machine itself and in its programmable memory devices. As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332.
Sec. 23. To attain a measure of integrity over the process, the electronic voting systems must also maintain an image of each ballot that is cast, such that records of individual ballots are maintained by a subsystem independent and distinct from the main vote detection, interpretation, processing, and reporting path. The electronic images of each […]
Sec. 24. Ballot card voting and electronic voting systems must include built-in test, measurement, and diagnostic software, and hardware for detecting and reporting the system’s status and degree of operability. As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332.
Sec. 25. A voting system must include capabilities of recording and reporting the date and time of normal and abnormal events and of maintaining a permanent record of audit information that cannot be turned off. A voting system must include provisions to detect and record significant events, such as casting a ballot, error conditions that […]
Sec. 26. The ballot counting software must be designed in a modular fashion and not be self-modifying. Modular programs must consist of code written in relatively small and easily identifiable sections, with each unit having a single entry point and a single exit point. Each module must have a specific function that can be tested […]
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Repealed by P.L.26-2000, SEC.46.
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Repealed by P.L.26-2000, SEC.46.
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Repealed by P.L.26-2000, SEC.46.
Sec. 3. A vendor may apply to the election division to examine a voting system and report on its accuracy, efficiency, and capacity. As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332.
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Repealed by P.L.26-2000, SEC.46.
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Repealed by P.L.26-2000, SEC.46.
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Amended by P.L.209-2003, SEC.167. Repealed by P.L.219-2013, SEC.53.
Sec. 33. The vendor shall provide for the real-time monitoring of system status and data quality. The election division (or the competent person designated by the commission to act on behalf of the election division) shall determine methods of assessment with the advice of a test authority. Implementation options include the following: (1) Hardware monitoring […]
Sec. 34. Measurement of the relative frequency of entry to program units and the frequency of exception conditions must be included as part of the quality assessment. As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332.
As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332. Repealed by P.L.176-1999, SEC.134.
Sec. 36. Software used in all systems must monitor the overall quality of data read-write and transfer quality status, checking the number and types of errors that occur in any of the relevant operations on data and how the errors were corrected. If the total number of corrected errors exceeds a predetermined threshold, or if […]
Sec. 37. Ballot card voting systems must rely on the retention of ballots as a redundant means of verifying election results. As a means of assuring accuracy in electronic voting systems, the unit must incorporate multiple memories in the machine itself and in the unit’s programmable memory devices. To attain a measure of integrity over […]
Sec. 38. The stored images of each ballot must protect the integrity of the data and the anonymity of each voter by such means as storage location scrambling. The ballot image records may be either machine readable or manually transcribed, or both, at the discretion of the vendor. As added by P.L.3-1997, SEC.332.
